Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On: What Have We Learned? by Shakespeare, Catherine
Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 7
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On: What
Have We Learned?
Catherine Shakespeare
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Accounting Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On: What Have We Learned?, 3 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 333 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol3/iss2/7
CATHERINE SHAKESPEARE*
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On:
What Have We Learned?
I. INTRODUCTION
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002' (THE "ACT" OR SOX) was signed into law on
July 30, 2002 in response to a series of corporate scandals that had rocked the U.S.
capital markets over the previous year, including the bankruptcies of Enron and
WorldCom.2 The Act was designed to restore investor confidence in the capital
markets by introducing several sweeping changes and reaffirming other extant rules
and regulations.' The changes included the introduction of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the auditing of public compa-
nies,4 reaffirming the requirements for companies to maintain effective internal
controls,' and requiring the auditors to attest to the effectiveness of these changes.6
These changes were seismic and felt by all parties involved in the capital markets,
especially the accounting and auditing professions.7
Over five years have passed since the passage of the Act. It is time to evaluate
what we know about its impact. The purpose of this Article is to review the ac-
counting literature to assess what we have learned to date. I break the research up
into several major areas: economic impact of the passage of the Act,' internal con-
trols,9 the impact on earnings and earnings quality," auditing and audit-related
* Assistant Professor of Accounting, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. This
Article is based on a presentation made at the University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank
Dennis Oswald and Teri Yohn for their insightful comments.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
2. See John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALE. L. REV. 211, 214-15 (2003).
3. Id. at 216.
4. Id. at 222.
5. 1. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring Shareholder Confidence,
29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 344 (2005).
6. Yan Zhang et al., Audit Committee Quality, Auditor Independence, and Internal Control Weaknesses, 26 J.
AcCT. & PUB. POL'Y 300, 303 (2007).
7. See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A
Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251 (2005) (explaining the changes brought by
Sarbanes-Oxley and the effects that those changes had on all those involved).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
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issues," and corporate governance. 2 While not always exhaustive, this review in-
cludes a broad sampling of the major studies in each area. Overall, SOX has been a
hugely significant piece of legislation as can be seen from the broad range of re-
search topics.
Research on the economic impact of the Act focuses on the market reaction to
the passage of the Act, the going private or going dark decisions of firms, and the
choice of the location of new stock market listings. 3 Overall, the results surround-
ing the market reactions to events surrounding the passage of the Act have been
mixed, most likely due to the difficulty of controlling other news events and the
choice of event dates. There has been a spike in the numbers of firms going private
and going dark.' However, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of SOX from
other concurrent changes in the economy, e.g., during the same period there has
been a rise in private equity as a source of capital, which could explain the increase
in the number of firms choosing to go private. Finally, some firms may be choosing
to list on foreign stock markets over the U.S. stock markets due to the requirements
of SOX. 5 At the same time, there have been significant changes in the global mar-
kets, unrelated to SOX, that could explain these listing choices. 6 Overall, it is diffi-
cult to attribute any economic consequences solely to SOX. However, it is more
than likely that SOX has played a significant role in many of these decisions.
Among some of the most significant requirements of SOX are those for report-
ing on the effectiveness of internal control. Two sections of SOX deal with internal
controls. Section 302 requires management to evaluate the effectiveness of the in-
ternal control system on a quarterly basis, and disclose any identified problems.'"
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. See infra Part II.A-C.
14. Ginger Carroll, Comment, Thinking Small: Adjusting Regulatory Burdens Incurred by Small Public Com-
panies Seeking to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxltey Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 443, 460-61 (2006). When a firm leaves
the public markets completely, it is referred to as going private. Id. at 460. When a firm ceases to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but continues to trade on the over-the-counter markets, it is
referred to as going dark. Id. at 461.
15. Cory L. Braddock, Comment, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors Would be Foolish to Pay a
Penny or a Pound for the Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, 2006 BYU L. REV. 175, 200-01.
16. Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings
3, 5, 22, 32 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987). Changes in
the global market, such as "improved quality, pricing, and liquidity of non-U.S. markets, the control by their
governments of many prospective non-U.S. issuers and their preference for a home country listing, and lower
transaction costs associated with listing in a non-U.S. market" as well as the "decline in the equity rating
premium for listing in" the United States have influenced the choice of firms to list on foreign stock markets
over the United States. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 102
(2007) (evaluating the decline in non-U.S. issuers choosing to list on the U.S. stock market and recognizing
that SOX is not the sole contributor to the decline).
17. Zhang et al., supra note 6, at 303.
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Section 404 requires management to report their assessment of the effectiveness of
the internal controls and have the auditors attest to management's report. 8
The research finds that firms reporting internal control problems have more
complex operations, recent organizational changes, greater accounting risk, more
auditor resignations, and fewer resources available for internal controls relative to
firms not disclosing such problems. 9 Furthermore, firms disclosing the most severe
internal control problems have material weaknesses, and are "smaller, younger, fi-
nancially weaker, more complex, growing rapidly and undergoing restructuring"
relative to non-disclosing firms.2" While the types of firms experiencing internal
control problems may not be surprising, the research highlights the importance of
understanding the type and severity of the internal control problems.2'
The market reactions to internal control problems disclosed under section 302
have been negative; market returns have been negative and the cost of equity capital
has increased for these firms.22 However, these reactions have been attenuated by
details in the disclosure (e.g., management's conclusions about the effectiveness of
the internal control system).23 For disclosures under section 404, there has been no
market reaction.24 This is somewhat surprising, and potentially could be a result of
these disclosures acting as a lagging indicator (i.e., the market already is aware of
the internal control problems) rather than a leading indicator (i.e., informing the
market of new internal control issues).
Furthermore, firms disclosing internal control problems have weaker earnings
quality.25 If a firm has an internal control problem, it is more likely that the earn-
ings contain intentional or unintentional errors.2' Therefore, we expect to see an
association between internal problems and earnings quality. Interestingly, this asso-
ciation holds for entity level problems and not problems with account-specific con-
trols. Once the internal control problem is remediated, the earnings quality of these
firms improves relative to those firms that have not remediated their internal con-
trol problems.
18. Id.
19. Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., The Discovery and Reporting of Internal Control Deficiencies Prior to SOX-
Mandated Audits, 44 J. AccT. & ECON. 166, 168 (2007).
20. Id. at 169.
21. Rani Hoitash et al., Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing Under the Sarbanes-Oxey Act 3 (Jan.
2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960720).
22. Messod Daniel Beneish et al., Internal Control Weaknesses and Information Uncertainty 34-35 (Sept.
2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=896192).
23. Jacqueline S. Hammersley et al., Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and
to the Characteristics of those Weaknesses Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 13 REV. Acct.
STUD. 141, 146-47, 164 (2008), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/c55826x43p2g618k/fulltext.
pdf.
24. Beneish et al., supra note 22, at 34.
25. See Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Rernediation
on Accrual Quality, 83 ACCT. REV. 217 (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=906474).
26. See id. (manuscript at 7).
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Researchers have asked two main questions related to the impact of SOX on
auditing and audit firms. First is whether firms that disclose internal control
problems pay higher audit fees.27 Because internal control reporting by the auditor
is likely to increase their audit risk exposure, it is reasonable to expect that firms
with internal control problems will pay higher audit fees. The results generally
show that firms disclosing internal control problems pay higher fees, and these fees
appear to remain high once the problem has been remediated." The second ques-
tion focuses on auditors themselves, and asks whether audit firms have been drop-
ping high risk clients.29 The results generally indicate that rather than dropping
high risk clients, auditors have been realigning their client portfolios because of
capacity constraint issues.3"
Several studies have examined many issues related to SOX and corporate govern-
ance. For example, studies have looked at audit committees, chief executive officer
(CEO) certifications, and revolving door appointments.3 Interestingly, internal
controls weaknesses are associated with less accounting financial expertise on the
audit committees. 2 There was no market reaction to CEO certifications required by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after the WorldCom failure.33 Fi-
nally, revolving door appointments, the practice of hiring auditors to finance posi-
tions, had positive market reactions and were not associated with restatements or
SEC actions.34 This result suggests that SOX may have been a little too zealous in
banning this practice.
Overall SOX, like all major reforms, has generated a significant amount of re-
search. 5 One could argue that some of the results could have been expected. How-
ever, three consistent themes come out of the results. First, the research highlights
the difficulty in disentangling the effects of SOX from other concurrent events.
Second, it is not merely the existence of an internal control problem that matters,
27. See K. Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama, SOX Section 404 Material Weakness Disclosures and Audit
Fees, 25 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 99, 101 (2006).
28. Jean C. Bedard et al., Audit Pricing and Internal Control Disclosures Among Non-Accelerated Filers
4-5 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.cornabstract=954048).
29. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 27, at 113.
30. See Michael Ettredge et al., Auditor Realignments Accompanying Implementation of SOX 404 Report-
ing Requirements 1 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=874836). See
generally Lynn E. Turner et al., An Inside Look at Auditor Changes, CPA J., Nov. 2005, available at http://www.
nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/1105/specialissue/essentials/pl2.htm.
31. See Marshall A. Geiger et al., The Hiring of Accounting and Finance Officers from Audit Firms: How Did
the Market React?, 13 REV. ACCT. STUD. 55 (2008); Brett R. Wilkinson & Curtis E. Clements, Corporate Govern-
ance Mechanisms and the Early-Filing of CEO Certification, 25 J. AcCT. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (2006); Zhang et al.,
supra note 6.
32. Zhang et al., supra note 6, at 301.
33. See BEVERLY HIRTLE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STOCK MARKET REACTION TO FINANCIAL STATE-
MENT CERTIFICATION BY BANK HOLDING COMPANY CEOs 10 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=425
002.
34. Geiger et al., supra note 31, at 57.
35. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 27, at 101; see also Hoitash et al., supra note 21, at 7.
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but the specific details of each problem. Third, understanding the whole informa-
tion environment is essential, e.g., why are there no reactions to section 404.
This Article outlines the research in more detail in each area identified, and then
concludes.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PASSAGE OF SOX
Researchers have asked three basic questions relating to the economic impact of the
passage of the Act: (1) What was the stock price reaction to key legislative dates
leading up to the passage of the Act?36 (2) Did more firms choose to go private or
go dark as a result of SOX? (3) Are firms choosing not to list in the United States
as a result of SOX?3  Each question has been posed by numerous researchers, but
not always with consistent results.
A. What is the stock price reaction to the key legislative dates?
SOX purposefully was designed to restore investor confidence in the capital mar-
kets." It is assumed that the stock price reactions to significant events related to the
probability of the passage of the Act summarize all of the market's perceived costs
and benefits of the Act. If the market agrees with SOX (i.e., benefits exceed costs)
then events increasing (decreasing) the probability of the Act passing should expe-
rience a positive (negative) reaction. However, if the market believes SOX's provi-
sions are an overreaction to an isolated problem, and the costs exceed the benefits,
then events increasing (decreasing) the probability of the Act passing should expe-
rience a negative (positive) reaction.
Zhang investigates the market reactions to seventeen events occurring from Jan-
uary 2002 through July 2002.40 She finds that overall the cumulative raw return for
the U.S. markets for these dates is significant (at a 10% level) and negative at about
15%."' Once she controls for other news, the abnormal return for U.S. markets is
insignificant.42 Controlling for news events is difficult because Zhang is looking at
market-wide implications of SOX.43 Therefore, she uses the returns from non-U.S.
traded foreign firms to proxy for normal U.S. returns." After further investigation,
she classifies four of the seventeen events as key.4" The cumulative abnormal (raw)
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infia Part II.B.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. Lucci, supra note 2, at 216.
40. Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 74,
89-91 (2007) (listing, describing, and summarizing information relating to the seventeen events).
41. Id. at 75.
42. Id. at 76.
43. Id. at 77.
44. Id. at 75, 77.
45. Id. at 88-93. These events are: (1) a speech by President Bush on July 9, 2002; (2) the Senate debates
during July 8-12, 2002; (3) the House Republicans giving up efforts to weaken the Senate Bill around July 18,
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return for these four key events is negative and significant, ranging from -3.76% to
-8.21% (15%).46
Next, Zhang investigates the possible sources of these private costs by looking at
cross-sectional results in relation to the major provisions of the Act.47 In particular,
she looks at the provisions related to non-audit services, corporate responsibilities,
provisions on the forfeiture of incentive pay, insider trading, and internal controls
(section 404). 41 Overall, she finds that abnormal returns decreased for firms that
purchase non-audit services, have foreign operations or international transactions,
and weak shareholder rights.49 Finally, she finds that firms receiving longer deferral
periods to the internal control requirements experienced significantly higher re-
turns.5 0 Overall, Zhang concludes that she finds no evidence that SOX was consid-
ered beneficial by investors.5 Furthermore she finds some evidence that certain
provisions of the Act impose private net costs on firms."2
Jain and Rezaee find contradictory results suggesting that the benefits of SOX
outweigh the costs for twelve event dates in the period from February 2002 to July
2002." They classify these event dates as having a favorable, unfavorable, or ambig-
uous impact on the passage of the Act.54 Jain and Rezaee hypothesize that investors
will react positively to events that increase the probability of passage of the Act.5"
Overall, the results are consistent with investors reacting positively (negatively) to
events that increase (decrease) the passage of the Act. 6 The market reaction to
ambiguous events was negative, but not significant.5 7
Next, they investigate if the magnitude of returns relating to favorable events
varies with firm corporate governance characteristics, financial reporting attributes,
and audit functions."8 They find that firms had more positive returns when they
were considered more compliant with the Act prior to enactment, e.g., firms with
better corporate governance, more reliable financial reports, and more credible au-
dit functions.59 They interpret this result as the Act imposing more compliance
2002; and (4) the Senate and the House agreement on the final rule on July 24, 2002 that President Bush signed
into law on July 30. Id.





51. See id. at 111.
52. Id. at 82, 110 (discussing the provisions giving rise to private costs).
53. Pankaj K. lain & Zabihollah Rezaee, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Capital-Market Behavior
Early Evidence, 23 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 629, 634-35, 652 (2006).
54. Id. at 633-36.
55. Id. at 638.
56. Id. at 647.
57. Id. at 642-44.
58. Id. at 648.
59. Id. at 651-52.
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costs on firms with poor governance and lower disclosure standards.' Overall, their
results support the hypothesis that investors perceived passage of the Act as a posi-
tive event with the benefits of the Act outweighing the costs.6
Li, Pincus, and Rego look at the market reactions to critical events surrounding
the passage of the Act, but are different from the previous two studies because they
investigate whether the extent of earnings management is associated with the mag-
nitude of the return.62 This study investigates eight separate event dates over the
period June 2002 through August 2002; the first event date is the WorldCom fraud
announcement, and the remaining event dates are related to passage of the Act. 3
The market reaction was negative and significant surrounding the WorldCom fraud
announcement (first event date) consistent with the market losing confidence in
corporate financial reporting.' Overall, the remaining seven event dates have cu-
mulative positive and significant return consistent with investors expecting SOX to
have net benefits.6" When Li et al. condition on the extent of earnings management
by firms, they find that the market reaction is stronger for firms that engage in
relatively more earnings management." These firms had a stronger negative reac-
tion to the WorldCom fraud announcement and a stronger positive reaction to the
remaining seven event dates.67
Finally, Engel, Hayes, and Wang investigate the abnormal returns surrounding
the passage of the Act as part of a larger study looking at the going private decisions
of firms surrounding the enactment of SOX." They consider six events in the pe-
riod from June 2002 to July 2005.69 Though the overall abnormal return is negative
for their event windows, they find that the return is positively related to firm size
and trading activity. This is consistent with smaller and less actively traded firms
reacting less favorably to events that increased the probability of the passage of the
Act. 71
60. Id. at 652.
61. Id.
62. Haidan Li et al., Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings
Management, 51 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1-5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
475163).
63. Id. (manuscript at 5-6).
64. See id. (manuscript at 13).
65. See id. (manuscript at 13-16).
66. Id. (manuscript at 18).
67. Id. (manuscript at 20).
68. See Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & EcoN.
116 (2007).
69. Id. at 134. The events studied were: (1) the SEC's proposal requiring executives to certify the informa-
tion in their companies' quarterly and annual reports on June 12, 2002; (2) the approval of Sarbanes' bill by the
Senate Banking Committee on June 18, 2002; (3) the WorldCom accounting scandal on June 26-27, 2002; (4)
the Senate's consideration of Sarbanes' bill between July 8-12, 2002; (5) the passage of Sarbanes' bill in the
Senate on July 15-16, 2002; and (6) the passage of SOX on July 24-25, 2002. See id.
70. Id. at 129, 143.
71. Id. at 136.
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Overall, the above results of the market reaction to the key legislative dates do
not present a clear picture of the perceived costs and benefits of the Act. This is
perhaps not surprising for several reasons. First, the studies focus on market-wide
effects for a given set of dates." Some of these dates cluster significantly in time,
particularly July 2002. It is difficult to isolate the impacts of just SOX; other infor-
mation events that impact the market73 need to be separated, and the studies de-
scribed above use differing methodologies to control for these effects. These
differences may, in part, help explain the different results. Second, the overall con-
clusion about the perceived benefits of SOX is sensitive to the choice of those event
dates. Zhang, Jain and Rezaee, and Li et al. all have slightly different, but still rele-
vant, event dates resulting in different interpretations of the impact of the Act." It
is reasonable to assume that the probability of the passage of SOX impacted firms,
but it is unlikely to have impacted all firms in exactly the same way. Therefore, I
think the cross-sectional tests provide more insights into the costs and benefits
imposed by the Act.7"
B. Did more firms choose to go private or go dark as a result of SOX?
A second line of research into the economic consequences of SOX is looking at
decisions of firms where the costs of SOX would be greater than the benefits of
SOX. For such firms there are two potential decisions. First, firms could choose to
leave the public markets completely, i.e., firms could choose to go private.76 Private
firms are not subject to the provisions of SOX.77 Second, firms could choose to go
72. See id. at 134; see also Li et al., supra note 62, (manuscript at 28-29 tbl.1) (describing "Critical Events
in the SOX Legislative Process and Contemporaneous Events").
73. Other information events that impact the market include news of other companies engaging in ac-
counting fraud, and more generally, changes in credit ratings. See Mark Maremont & Laurie P. Cohen, Former
Tyco CEO Is Charged With Two New Felony Counts, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A3 (reporting that Dennis
Kozlowski was charged with tax evasion and tampering with evidence); Mark Maremont, Xerox Overstated
Pretax Income By $1.41 Billion, Filing Reveals, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2002, at A3 (severe misstatement of income);
see also Robert Brooks et al., The National Market Impact of Sovereign Rating Changes, 28 J. BANKING & FIN.
233, 249 (2004).
74. The Jain and Rezaee study considered three periods of several weeks: from Feb. 14, 2002 to June 25,
2002; from July 9, 2002 to July 19, 2002; and from July 24, 2002 to July 30, 2003. Jain & Rezaee, supra note 53,
at 634 fig.1. The dates of the Li et al. study include: June 25, 2002; June 26, 2002; July 8-12, 15-16, 24, 25, and
29-30 2002; and Aug. 14-15, 2002. Li et al., supra note 62, (manuscript at 28-29 tbl.1). Finally, the dates used
in the Zhang study include: Jan. 17, 2002; Feb. 2, 13, and 28, 2002; Mar. 7 and 26, 2002; Apr. 11, 16, 24, and 25,
2002; May 8, 2002; June 11-12, 18 and 25, 2002; July 8-10, 15-16, 18-20, and 23-25, 2002. Zhang, supra note
40, at 89-91 tbl.2.
75. These cross-sectional tests are subject to some of the same criticisms as the main univariate results:
clustering of dates in time and adequately controlling for other news events. See Li et al., supra note 62,
(manuscript at 7).
76. See Engel et al., supra note 68, at 122.
77. See id. at 119-20 (stating that "SOX mandates a series of changes in corporate financial reporting and
corporate governance for public companies").
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dark, i.e., cease filing with the SEC, but continue to trade on the over-the-counter
(OTC) markets.7"
Engel, Hayes, and Wang look at the effects of SOX on firms perceived to be close
to going private.79 They argue that for a firm to go private because of SOX, the
additional net costs of SOX must exceed any net benefits of being a publicly listed
company.8" Overall, they conclude that SOX impacted firms' going-private deci-
sions.8  They look at the quarterly frequency of firms' going-private decisions over
the period from 1998 through 2005 and find a statistically significant increase in
the number of firms going private in the post-SOX period. 2 In addition, as dis-
cussed above, they find that returns to key legislative dates are positively associated
with firm size and trading activity, suggesting that the costs of SOX are greater for
smaller, less liquid companies.8 3 Finally, they find that the determinants of going-
private decisions have not changed, but the market reactions to going-private an-
nouncements have resulted in larger market returns for smaller firms with greater
inside ownership in the post-SOX world. 4
Overall, it appears reasonable to think that SOX has been responsible, in part, for
the rise in the incidence of firms going private. However, it is difficult to com-
pletely disentangle the effects of SOX from the effects of the rise in private equity
on the decisions of firms to go private." It is likely many of these decisions were
made with factors such as the growth in private equity and SOX, among others, in
play. 6
Instead of going private, firms could choose to cease filing with the SEC, but to
continue to trade on the OTC markets.8 7 These firms no longer report financial
information to the SEC, hence the term "go dark." Leuz, Triantis, and Wang investi-
gate the firms that chose to go dark over the period from 1998 through 2004.8 In
general, firms that choose to go dark are more distressed, have increased short-
term liabilities, decreased trading volume, and deteriorating operating performance
78. See id. at 125.
79. Id. at 121-124.
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 142.
82. Id. at 125-27.
83. Id. at 132-36. The costs of SOX are unlikely to vary completely with firm size. Smaller firms will
experience relatively more costly compliance costs. See id. at 143.
84. Id. at 142-43.
85. Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion of Evidence From
Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. AcCT. & ECON. 146, 149 (2007).
86. Id. at 161-62.
87. See Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC
Deregistrations, 45 J. AcCT. & EcoN. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1, on file with author). Firms can
deregister from the SEC if they have fewer than 300 shareholders of record or fewer than 500 shareholders of
record, and less than $10 million in assets in each of the previous three years. Id. Many beneficial shareholders
have their shares held by financial institutions. Id. The financial institution and not the beneficial shareholder
would count for the deregistering requirements. Id.88. Id. (manuscript at 2).
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compared to firms that could deregister, but choose not to. 9 There is an increase in
the number of deregistrations in the post-SOX period; more than 60% of the go-
ing-dark decisions made from 1998 through 2004 were made in the last two years.9"
After controlling for both the market return and any time trends, SOX is signifi-
cantly associated with going dark.9" The results show that the number of going-
dark firms decreases when the SEC extended the deadline for smaller firms to meet
the requirements of section 404.92 Furthermore, the study finds that in the post-
SOX period agency problems appear to be more important determinants than dis-
tress factors.93 The study concludes that it appears the higher costs of SOX may
have been attributable to the increased rise in firms' going-dark decisions.
94
These results would appear to provide strong evidence of the impact of SOX on
firm behavior. It would be interesting to see the study extended to past the time
period when all firms must comply with the internal control provisions of the Act
(years ending on or after December 15, 2008) to determine whether 2003-04 is
only a spike or a rising trend due to other related factors in the market.
C. Are firms choosing not to list in the United States as a result of SOX?
If SOX creates a cost barrier to entry into the U.S. markets, then we would expect
to see a drop in the number of listings into U.S. markets from foreign firms. Pio-
troski and Srinivasan investigate whether there has been a change in the listing
behavior of firms into the United States since the enactment of SOX, by comparing
U.S. and U.K. listings over the time period from 1995 to 2006."5 New foreign list-
ings on both U.S. markets and the U.K. main market declined in the post-SOX
period, but listings on London's Alternative Investment Market (AIM) increased.96
Piotroski and Srinivasan investigate whether the changes in the listing behaviors
can be attributable to SOX.97 They find that there have been changing attributes in
listing firms that explain about half of the post-Sox decline in listings.9 In particu-
lar, smaller less profitable firms are choosing to list on London's Alternative Invest-
ment Market (AIM).99 So even without the enactment of SOX, the frequency of
U.S. listings relative to U.K. listings would have declined."° However, once these
changes in attributes are controlled for, a strong time effect exists for the SOX time
89. Id. (manuscript at 3).
90. See id. (manuscript at 48 tbl.1) (listing timing of deregistration filings).
91. Id. (manuscript at 24).
92. Id. (manuscript at 25-26).
93. Id. (manuscript at 26).
94. See id. (manuscript at 27-33).
95. Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 16.
96. Id. at 4-5.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. at 6.
99. See id. at 5.
100. See id. at 6.
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period.'' The study provides evidence that the firms that chose to list in the United
Kingdom rather than in the United States in the post-SOX period mainly are com-
posed of AIM-listed firms; these firms are from developed countries and are
smaller and less profitable than U.S. listed firms.1"2 In addition, a small set of large
profitable firms from emerging markets have chosen to list in the United States in
the post-SOX period.0 3
The study finds an increase in the number of AIM listings but does not control
for the preferential tax treatment now received by investors in the AIM market.0 4
In addition, the passage of SOX coincides with the European Union introducing a
requirement for all European countries to file using International Financial Report-
ing Standards (IFRS)."'0 These variables could have an important impact on the
location of a new listing. Furthermore, there appears to have been a shift in global
equity markets away from the United States,0 6 of which SOX may be only a small
component. Interestingly, no study has looked at the firms choosing to delist for
the United States. This group of firms may provide an interesting sample to study.
Overall the results on the economic consequences of the passage of the Act are
mixed. The market reactions to its passage do not present a consistent pattern,
likely consistent with the differential impact that regulation has on firms. It appears
that more firms have gone private or dark since the Act. These are likely to be
partly due to SOX, but isolating the impacts of SOX alone is very challenging.
Finally, there appears to have been a shift away from U.S. capital markets, but this
is likely due not only to U.S. regulatory changes, but also to changes in global
markets.
III. INTERNAL CONTROL
Two provisions of SOX require firms to make disclosures about internal controls.
Section 302 requires senior management of the firm to evaluate the effectiveness of
the internal control system and to report on its effectiveness on a quarterly basis. 7
Section 404 requires an annual audit of management's assessment of the effective-
ness of the internal control.'08 These two sections, in particular section 404, have
101. See id. at 7.
102. Id. at 31.
103. Id.
104. See generally BAKER TILLY & Co. LTD., A GUIDE TO AIM TAX BENEFITS (2007).
105. See Jeannot Blanchet, Global Standards Offer Opportunity, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1, 2002, at 28. For
example, British Airways delisted from the U.S. in April 2007, stating that "the cost and complexity" of comply-
ing with two sets of regulations that are quite similar substantively could no longer be justified. Emmet Oliver,
BA to leave the Big Board Marketplace, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 26, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2007/04/25/business/bxboac.php.
106. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY
MARKET 29 (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The-Competitive-Positionofthe-US-Public
_EquityMarket.pdf.
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2000).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
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generated the most discussion in the press about the appropriateness of the Act.'0 9
The research in this area addresses two main questions: (1) What types of firms
have internal control problems?" ' (2) What are the market reactions to the disclo-
sure of an internal control problem?"'
A. What types of firms have internal control problems?
The three types of internal control problems or deficiencies are, in increasing order
of severity: deficiencies, significant deficiencies, and material weaknesses." 2 Mate-
rial weaknesses are especially severe because they indicate control problems that are
most likely to result in material misstatements of the financial statements." 3 Two
studies have investigated the determinants of internal control deficiencies. Ash-
baugh-Skaife et al. look at the determinants of reporting internal control deficien-
cies (ICD) for a sample of firms that disclosed ICDs prior to the mandatory
internal control audits required by section 404 of the Act." 4 Doyle, Ge, and McVay
focus on the determinants of the most severe ICDs, material weakness
disclosures.'' 5
Prior to the implementation of section 404, management was required, under
section 302, to disclose their evaluation of the effectiveness of the system of internal
controls."6 Using a sample of 585 firms over the period from November 2003
through December 2004, Ashbaugh et al. investigate the determinants of reporting
an ICD under section 302."' This time period has the advantage that both acceler-
ated and non-accelerated filers filed all three internal control deficiencies."' They
model ICD disclosures as a function of internal control risk factors and the incen-
tives to discover and disclose control problems for management and auditors. In-
ternal control risk is modeled as complexity and scope of firms' operations,
changes in the firms' organizational structure, exposure to accounting errors due to
judgment or difficulty, firms' resources available for internal controls, and whether
the auditor resigned in 2003."' Incentives to discover and disclose are modeled as
auditor dominance, prior restatement or SEC enforcement action, monitoring by
109. See Greg Farrell, Accounting Costs Rising As Wary Companies Play It Safe, USA TODAY, July 31, 2003, at
2B; SEC to Delay 404(b) for Small Companies, CFO MAG., Feb. 1, 2008, at 31; Allison Fass, One Year Later, The
Impact ofSarbanes-Oxley, FORBES.COM, July 22, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/execpicks/2003/07/22/cz-af-0722
sarbanes.html.
110. See infra Part III.A.
111. See infra Part II.B.
112. See Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., supra note 19, at 170.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 167-68.
115. Jeffrey Doyle, Weii Ge & Sarah McVay, Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 193, 194 (2007).
116. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., supra note 19, at 167.
117. Id. at 168.
118. Id. at 170.
119. Id. at 168.
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institutional investors, and industry litigation risk. 2' Firms that disclose ICDs have
more complex operations and are exposed to more potential accounting errors rel-
ative to non-ICD firms. 2' In addition, these firms are more likely to have recently
experienced an organizational change and/or an auditor resignation.'22 Finally,
firms that report a higher frequency of losses and are in financial distress are more
likely to report ICDs.'23 Incentives to discover and disclose an ICD are driven by
firms that engage one of the largest U.S. audit firms, firms that previously restated
or were subject to an SEC enforcement action, and by firms that have concentrated
institutional ownership.'24
Doyle, Ge, and McVay focus only on firms disclosing a material weakness in the
period between August 2002 to 2005.125 They consider whether the material weak-
ness is an account-specific problem or an entity-level problem.'26 The former are
considered auditable, while the latter are considered much more serious. Overall,
Doyle, Ge, and McVay find that firms that disclose a material weakness are "smaller,
younger, financially weaker, more complex, growing rapidly, and/or undergoing
restructuring" (as stated in the findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.).' 27 When Doyle
et al. condition on the type of material weakness, account-specific or entity-level,
they find that the determinants of ICD change across the two sub-samples. 2 Firms
with entity-level problems are smaller, younger, and financially weaker.' 29 Firms
with account-specific problems are financially healthy, but have complex, diversi-
fied, and rapidly changing operations. 3 ' Finally, Doyle look at a specific reason for
the weakness.' 3' They categorize the weaknesses into three types based on manage-
ments' disclosed cause: weakness related to staffing issues, weakness related to com-
plexity, and other issues.'32 Again, they find that rapidly growing, smaller, and
younger firms have weaknesses related to staffing and that smaller, financially
weaker, more operationally and geographically diverse firms suffer from weak-
nesses related to complexity."'
While the types of firms that experience material weakness are perhaps not sur-
prising, the differences in the determinants of different types of weaknesses rein-
force that not all material weaknesses are created equal. The incentives to discover
120. Id. at 174.
121. See id. at 169-70.
122. Id. at 181.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 178.
125. See Doyle, Ge & McVay, supra note 115, at 194.
126. See id. at 196.
127. Id. at 195; see also Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., supra note 19, at 169.
128. See Doyle, Ge & McVay, supra note 115, at 196-97.
129. Id. at 195.
130. Id. at 196-97.
131. See id. at 197.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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and disclose internal control problems are important to understand. However, Le-
one raises concerns about possible alternate explanations for some of the results in
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., suggesting that we do not yet understand this critical part of
internal control deficiencies.' 34
B. What are the market reactions to the disclosure of an internal control problem?
It is unclear how investors perceive disclosures of internal control problems. On the
one hand, research has shown that there is a clear correlation between internal
control problems and firm characteristics; therefore investors already may have an-
ticipated the internal control problem and may not be surprised by the disclo-
sure. 35  Alternatively, auditors have suggested that investors will not fully
understand the implications of these disclosures.' Investigating investors' reac-
tions to such disclosures, however, is not that straightforward because these disclo-
sures are contained in SEC filings that always contain other information.'37
Nevertheless, three published studies looked at investor reactions to internal con-
trol problem disclosures.
Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare examine the stock price reaction to inter-
nal control weaknesses disclosed under section 302.13 They hypothesize that the
size of the market reaction will vary with the severity of the weakness and with the
characteristics of the disclosure.'39 They find that size-adjusted returns on the date
of the disclosure are on "average -0.95% when material weaknesses are disclosed,"
"-0.75% when significant deficiencies are disclosed," and "are not different from
zero when control deficiencies are disclosed." 4 They also find that if the weak-
nesses are not auditable, or when the disclosures are vague, the returns are signifi-
cantly more negative. 4' However, if management concludes that the internal
control system is effective, the returns are significantly less negative. 4 2 These results
emphasize the importance of not only the disclosure itself, but the content of the
disclosure as well. 43
134. Andrew J. Leone, Factors Related to Internal Control Disclosure: A Discussion of Ashbaugh, Collins, and
Kinney (2007) and Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007), 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 224, 230-36 (2007). Large audit firms are
better equipped to identify internal controls problems than small audit firms. Id. at 230-33.
135. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text; see also Edith G. Orenstein, Remediation, Communica-
tion, Education: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2004, at 28. See generally Beneish et al., supra
note 22.
136. Orenstein, supra note 135, at 28-29.
137. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401, 15 U.S.C. § 7261 (2000).
138. Hammersley et al., supra note 23, at 142-45.
139. Id. at 143-45.
140. Id. at 144.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 144-45.
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Beneish, Billings, and Hodder analyze the unaudited 302 disclosures and the au-
dited 404 disclosures.'" They find that the disclosures made under section 302 are
associated with a negative market reaction of -1.8% and with an abnormal increase
in the cost of equity of 68 basis points. "5 Next, the study looks at the market re-
sponse to section 404 both conditional and unconditional on prior 302 disclo-
sures. 46 However, they do not find any impact on stock prices or cost of equity
when internal control weaknesses are disclosed under section 404. 7
Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan examine the association between the
cost of equity capital and the first-time disclosure of an internal control problem
under section 404 of the Act. 4 ' They find higher cost of implied equity capital for
these firms.4 9 However, once they control for the characteristics of firms with in-
ternal control problems identified in previous research and analysts' forecast bias,
the association disappears, consistent with Beneish, Billings, and Hodder.15 0
The lack of reaction to the disclosures under section 404 could be a result of
section 404 being a lagging indicator of problems, rather than a leading indica-
tor.' It appears that management needs to identify an error before reporting a
problem. 2 In addition, firms are reporting problems under section 302, so the
section 404 news may not be new.5 3 The spirit of the Act appeared to intend these
control disclosures to be a warning sign of potential future problems.5 4 However,
even given these limitations, there appears to be a consensus that internal control
reporting has led to improved controls.'15
144. See Beneish et al., supra note 22, at 2.
145. Id. at 31-32.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 27-28.
148. Maria Ogneva et al., Internal Control Weaknesses and Cost of Equity: Evidence from SOX Section 404
Disclosures, 82 AcCT. REV. 1255, 1256, 1286 (2007).
149. Id. at 1256, 1267, 1286.
150. Id. at 1256-57, 1267, 1271-72, 1286.
151. GREGORY JONAS ET AL., MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., THE THIRD YEAR OF SECTION 404 REPORTING ON
INTERNAL CONTROL 2, 5-6 (2007).
152. Id. at 6.
153. See Aloke Ghosh & Martien Lubberink, Timeliness and Mandated Disclosures on Internal Controls
Under Section 404 6 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractjid=931896); Nate M. Stephens, The Discovery and Disclosure of Material Weaknesses Under SOX
Section 302: The Role of Company and Auditor Characteristics and Incentives 27-28 (Dec. 13, 2007) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1073026).
154. See Hammersley et al., supra note 23, at 142.
155. See, e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., supra note 25.
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IV. IMPACT ON EARNINGS AND EARNINGS QUALITY
The quality of financial reporting is fundamentally linked to the strength of the
internal control system. 6 Weak control environments can lead to intentional or
unintentional errors in the financial reports.5 7 The accounting literature considers
earnings quality to be an important dimension of financial reporting quality.5 8
There is no single agreed upon definition of earnings quality.5 9 However, earnings
would be considered high quality if the related receivables turn into cash flows, i.e.,
customers paying, and are repeatable or persistent, i.e., not a once-off gain. 60 Re-
search in this area has focused on many aspects of earnings including the quality of
accounting accruals, the impact of internal control reporting on the earnings qual-
ity for banks, meeting an earnings target, and the use of pro-forma (non-standard)
earnings.' 6
Doyle, Ge, and McVay investigate the quality of financial reporting, specifically
the quality of accruals, for firms disclosing material weaknesses. 6 ' A weak control
environment could allow for intentionally biased accruals, via earnings manage-
ment, or unintentional errors.'63 Doyle, Ge, and McVay hypothesize that weak in-
ternal controls are associated with low accruals quality, i.e., earnings are not
realized as cash flows, and that entity-level weaknesses are associated with lower
accruals quality than account-specific weaknesses.'64 Overall, they find that weak
internal controls are associated with lower accruals quality. 65 However, when they
condition on the type of problem, only the entity-level weaknesses are associated
with lower accruals quality.'66 This result further enforces the importance of not
treating all material weaknesses uniformly.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond examine the relationship between
accrual quality and internal controls and their remediation.'67 Consistent with
Doyle et al., they find that firms with internal control problems have lower quality
156. See David W. Wright, Evidence on the Relation Between Corporate Governance Characteristics and
the Quality of Financial Reporting 1-4 (May 1996) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfio?abstract id= 10138).
157. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Doyle et al., Accruals Quality and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 82
ACCT. REV. 1141, 1142 (2007).
158. PATRICIA M. DECHOW & CATHERINE M. SCHRAND, EARNINGS QUALITY 5 (2004).
159. Id. at 2.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Doyle et al., supra note 157, at 1141. Li, Pincus, and Rego describe accruals in the following way:
"[N]et income can be decomposed into operating cash flows and accruals. Accruals are accounting adjustments
management makes to place a company's financial statements on a full accrual (rather than cash) basis, as
required under generally accepted accounting principles." Li et al., supra note 62, (manuscript at 10).




167. See Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., supra note 25, (manuscript at 1). Remediation involves modifying the
internal control system to remove any identified weakness. See id. (manuscript at 2).
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accruals relative to firms without these problems.6 ' These weak internal control
firms have large positive and negative accruals that could suggest intentional or
unintentional errors.'69 Once the internal control system has been remediated and
the remediation has been confirmed by the auditor, the firms exhibit an improve-
ment in accruals quality relative to firms not reporting a remediation 7 ° Finally, for
firms receiving different internal control opinion audits over successive years, Ash-
baugh-Skaife et al. document changes in accrual quality that are consistent with the
changes in the quality of the internal control system.'7' Combined, these two pa-
pers show a strong association between internal control quality and accruals qual-
ity, an important determination in the quality of the reported earnings.
SOX was not the first piece of legislation to require reporting on internal con-
trols systems. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991.72 (FDICIA) requires large banks to report management's assessment of the
effectiveness of internal control systems."' These requirements were largely the
model used by Congress in the design of the internal control sections for SOX.'74
Altamuro and Beatty examine the relationship between the characteristics of earn-
ings and increased internal control procedures for the banks affected by the regula-
tion. 7 s Their results showed improvements in earnings quality in the post-FDICIA
period for the affected banks.'76 They conclude that it is not unreasonable to antici-
pate similar improvements in earnings quality in a post-SOX world.'77
Cohen et al. look at earnings management behavior pre- and post-SOX. "' They
classify earnings management into two main types, accruals-based earnings man-
agement ... and real earnings management. 8 They find that accruals-based earn-
168. Id.
169. See id. (manuscript at 1).
170. Id. (manuscript at 2).
171. Id.
172. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
173. Id. § 112, 105 Stat. at 2242-43.
174. See Jennifer Altamuro & Anne Beatty, Do Internal Control Reforms Improve Earnings Quality? 25-26
(May 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=930
690).
175. Id. at 4-6, 9-10, 25-26.
176. See id. at 19-23.
177. See id. at 25-26.
178. Daniel A. Cohen et al., Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes
Oxley Periods, 83 ACCT. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, 33, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=813088).
179. See id. (manuscript at 5). Accruals earnings management involves management changing estimates of
accruals, either up or down, to ensure a certain earning target is met. John R. Graham et al., The Economic
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32-36 (2005). Real earnings management
involves management cutting real expenditures to meet an earnings target, e.g., cutting research and develop-
ment expenditures. Id.
180. See Cohen et al., supra note 178, (manuscript at 5). Common earnings targets, or benchmarks, are
making a profit, showing positive growth in earnings and meeting or exceeding the consensus analysts forecast.
See Graham et al., supra note 179, at 5-6, 21-24.
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ings management increased steadily up to the passage of the Act followed by a
significant decline in the post-SOX period. 8  Conversely, real earnings manage-
ment declined prior to the passage of the Act, but has been on the rise since.'82 So
in the post-SOX world, firms are meeting earnings targets by cutting real expendi-
tures. SOX reduced the level of accruals-based earnings management, but the rise
of real earnings management may be an unintended consequence.'83
Consistent with Cohen et al., Koh et al. find that managers are relying less on
accruals-based management to hit analyst earnings targets post passage of the
Act.'8 4 Instead, managers appear to be using earnings guidance to meet earnings
benchmarks.' Koh et al. also find that the incidence of just meeting an earnings
benchmark, and the related market premium have decreased. 8 However, the re-
duction in the market premium may be unwarranted as just meeting an earnings
benchmark appears to be a signal of future operating performance. 7
In recent years, many firms have emphasized pro-forma, or generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP)-adjusted, earnings in their press releases.'88 Section
401(b) of SOX directs the SEC to issue final rules on pro-forma disclosures. 9 The
regulation must ensure that these disclosures do not mislead investors and provide
181. See Cohen et al., supra note 178, (manuscript at 2, 20, 33-34).
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Kevin Koh et al., Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations in the Post-Scandals World: Changes in
Stock Market Rewards and Managerial Actions 2-3, 15-24 (Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=879831).
185. See id. at 16, 18.
186. Id. at 2-3, 15, 24.
187. See id. at 25-26.
188. See Press Release, Corel Corp., Corel Corporation Reports Second Quarter Results (June 28, 2006),
available at http://www.corel.com/servlet/Satellite/us/en/Content/1153321430604?pressld=1154111596230;
Press Release, Handspring, Inc., Handspring Reports Third Quarter Results (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://
www.palm.com/us/company/pr/hs-archive/041503.html; Press Release, Intuit Inc., Intuit First-Quarter Reve-
nue Grows 27 Percent (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.intuit.com/about intuitpress-room/press-re-
lease/2007/1115.jhtml; Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Anticipates Earnings Per Share Growth in 2008;
Reaffirms Long-Term, Double-Digit Compound Annual EPS Growth from 2005 to 2010, Excluding Certain
Items (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press.releases/financiall2007-1204.html;
Press Release, Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. Announces Financial Results for
Third Fiscal Quarter of 2006 (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.monolithicpower.com/PressReleases/pr_
06103001_Q306_FinancialResults.htm; Press Release, Sycamore Networks, Inc., Sycamore Networks, Inc. Re-
ports First Quarter Fiscal Year 2008 Financial Results (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sycamorenet.
com/corporate/news/press-release.asp?news itemid=881 (all referencing GAAP standards in their profits
forecast).
189. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (Supp. V 2007) ("Not later than 180 days after
July 30, 2002, the Commission shall issue final rules providing that pro forma financial information included
in any periodic or other report filed with the Commission pursuant to the securities laws, or in any public
disclosure or press or other release, shall be presented in a manner that-(1) does not contain an untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the pro forma financial
information, in light of the circumstances under which it is presented, not misleading; and (2) reconciles it
with the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer under generally accepted accounting
principles.").
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a reconciliation to earnings reported under GAAP. 19° This section led to the SEC
issuing Regulation G in January 2003. Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mer-
genthaler examine who trades on pro-forma earnings. 9' Their results show that
less sophisticated individual investors appear to rely most heavily on these disclo-
sures. 19 2 These results further justify the SOX-related regulations designed to pro-
tect investors.
V. AUDITING AND AUDIT FIRMS
SOX, and the events surrounding its passage, brought massive change to the ac-
counting profession. The Act established the PCAOB to oversee the audit of public
companies.' All audit firms that wish to audit a public company must be regis-
tered with the PCAOB and are subject to its oversight.'94 Auditors are required to
opine on management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls.9 ' In
addition to all these changes, the demise of Arthur Andersen caused many large
public companies to look for a new auditor.'96 There have been two types of ques-
tions examined with regard to auditing and the audit firms: (1) What is the impact
of the Act on audit fees?' 97 (2) What is the impact of the Act on client risk
assessment? "
A. What is the impact of the Act on audit fees?
Internal control problems should be considered an increase in audit risk resulting
in a commensurate increase in audit fees.'" Currently, firms are subject to different
internal control requirements based on size." Accelerated flers must have their
190. Id.
191. See Nilabhra Bhattacharya et al., Who Trades on Pro Forma Earnings Information?, 82 ACCT. REV. 581
(2007).
192. Id. at 605.
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 ("There is established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to. over-
see the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect
the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and inde-
pendent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors.").
194. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Bylaws and Rules § 2.2100 (2007), available at http://www.pcao
bus.org/Rules/Rules_of theBoard/Section_2.pdf.
195. See id. § AS5.71, available at http://www.pcaobus.orgRules/Rules..oftheBoardlAuditing..Standard-
5.pdf ("The auditor should form an opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting by
evaluating evidence obtained from all sources, including the auditor's testing of controls, misstatements de-
tected during the financial statement audit, and any identified control deficiencies.").
196. See Cathy Booth Thomas, Called to Account, TIME, June 18, 2002, at 52 (noting that as of June 2002,
over one third of Andersen's 2,300 clients had left the firm).
197. See infra Part V.A.
198. See infta Part V.B.
199. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 27; Hoitash et al., supra note 21 (each paper discussing the
correlation between internal control problems and increased audit fees).
200. See Marc H. Folladori, A Practical Overview of the SEC's Internal Controls and Executive Certification
Disclosure Rules, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 470 (2008) (noting that at least
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auditor attest to the effectiveness of the internal control.2 ' Non-accelerated filers
are not yet subject to the internal control audits, but are subject to disclosures
under section 302.202
Both Raghunandan and Rama, and Hoitash et al. examine association between
audit pricing and internal control problems under sections 302 and 404.203 They
find a strong association between audit fees and internal control problems.0 4 In
addition, Hoitash et al. show that the audit pricing varies with the severity of the
control problems or by the nature of the problem.2 5 Audit fees increased in the
section 404 period.2" However, the results show relatively less risk adjustment to
fees in the section 404 period as compared with the section 302 period.27 Finally,
the results show that if firms disclose a problem under 302 they continue to pay
higher audit fees, even if there were no disclosures about internal control problems
when section 404 became effective.20 8
The requirement to attest to the effectiveness of the internal control system
means the auditor is required to do considerably more work.0 9 However, these
opinions have been required only for accelerated filers.210 Bedard et al. examine the
audit fees of non-accelerated filers who are subject to section 302 only.2" ' Auditors
are not required to audit the controls under section 302.212 However, any disclosed
problem is likely to indicate an additional audit risk or greater engagement effort.
Bedard et al. find that the audit fees are higher for firms that disclose internal
control problems. 2 3 They also find any risk adjustment to fees does not change
until December 15, 2008 accelerated filers, those with an aggregate market value of over $75 million, are subject
to the full section 404 filing requirements, whereas smaller companies are not).
201. See id. ("All domestic companies meeting the definition of 'accelerated filer' (i.e., a company having an
aggregate market value of common equity held by non-affiliates of $75 million or more as of the last day of its
most recently completed second fiscal quarter), have been required to comply with the SOX Section 404 rules
[including an auditor attestation to the effectiveness of the internal control] for their annual reports with
respect to fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004.").
202. See id. ("For these non-accelerated filers, the auditor's attestation report on internal controls would not
be required to be filed until their annual report for the first fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2008.").
203. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 27; Hoitash et al., supra note 21.
204. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 27, at 112; Hoitash et al., supra note 21, at 25.
205. See Hoitash et al., supra note 21, at 25-27.
206. See id. at 21 (noting a 28.1% increase in auditing fees for companies disclosing at least one control
problem in the 404 period).
207. See id. at 21-22.
208. See id. at 27-28.
209. See, e.g., Nancy T. Hill et al., Auditors' Reactions to Sarbanes Oxley, CPA J., July 2007, at 6 (noting that
when Sarbanes-Oxley was first implemented that there was a great increase in the workload of auditors).
210. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. Non-accelerated filers must comply with section 404
for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2008. See Folladori, supra note 200.
211. See Jean C. Bedard et al., Audit Pricing and Internal Control Disclosures Among Non-Accelerated
Filers (2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=954
048).
212. See id. at 3-4 & n.2 (noting that the only internal controls reporting required for non-accelerated filers
is currently derived from section 302).
213. Id. at 4-5.
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between 2003 and 2004.24 In addition, firms that remediate their internal control
problems in 2003 continue to pay higher fees in 2004.215 These results suggest there
is a spillover effect from section 404 to section 302, with audit firms preparing their
clients for eventual compliance with section 404.216 Alternatively, the results could
be due to reduced competition and increased market power of audit firms after
Arthur Andersen. '7
Overall, these results show a fee increase in response to an increased audit risk.
An intuitively pleasing result, but one that previous research on the relationship
between audit pricing and audit risk has not had clear results on.
B. What has been the impact of the Act on client risk assessment?
Two major structural changes have occurred in the industry that would have re-
quired the audit firms to reevaluate their portfolio of audit clients. First, a flood of
potential new clients became available with the demise of Arthur Andersen.1 8 Sec-
ond, section 404 required the auditors to attest to the internal control assessment of
management."' Landsman, Nelson, and Roundtree investigate auditor switches in
the pre- and post-Enron era. 2' They find that auditors realigned their client port-
folios due to capacity constraints rather than in response to sensitivity to client risk
assessment.22' Additionally, their results suggest that SOX did not impact Big N
switching behavior incremental to the initial Arthur Andersen shock.222
Client risk assessment and audit intensity will be affected directly by the strength
of the internal control system. 22 In a theoretical investigation into the effects of
SOX on audit intensity and internal controls, Patterson and Smith find that inter-
nal control tests are a valuable tool when these tests are informative about the
likelihood of fraud.224 SOX has the desired impact of inducing stronger internal
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 21.
217. See, e.g., Emilie R. Feldman, A Basic Quantification of the Competitive Implications of the Demise of
Arthur Andersen, 29 REV. INDUS. ORG. 193, 193-98 (2006).
218. See id. at 197-98.
219. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. V 2007) (requiring that "each registered public
accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assess-
ment made by the management of the issuer").
220. Wayne R. Landsman et al., An Empirical Analysis of Big N Auditor Switches: Evidence From the Pre-
and Post-Enron Eras (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=899544).
221. See id. at 30-31.
222. See id. Big N in this study refers to Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers (or its predecessor firms, Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lynbrand). Id. at 35 tbl.l.
223. See, e.g., Evelyn R. Patterson & J. Reed Smith, The Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on Auditing and Internal
Control Strength, 82 ACCT. REV. 427, 442 (2007).
224. See id. at 427.
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control systems and less fraud, but does not necessarily lead to more control test-
ing.25 Furthermore, the passage of SOX leads to higher audit risk.226
VI. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Several studies have looked at either the changes in corporate governance require-
ments resulting directly from provisions of SOX or at the impact on corporate
governance in a post-SOX environment. Prior to SOX, it was not uncommon for
firms to hire accounting and financing officers from their auditors, referred to as
revolving-door hires.227 SOX prohibited these revolving door hires.2 Gieger, Len-
fiox, and North examined the market reaction to these hires before the SOX
changes. 9 They find the number of revolving-door hires is very small, only about
6.1%, and the market reacts more positively to these appointments than other
types of appointments.23 ° This positive market reaction is driven by smaller compa-
nies."' In addition, these appointments are not associated with lower financial re-
porting quality or receipt of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAER).232 Overall, it might appear that this is an area where SOX may have
overstepped.
Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou investigate the quality of the audit committee post-SOX;
in particular, they look at the relation between audit committee quality, auditor
independence, and internal control weaknesses.2" ' Firms are more likely to have
internal control weaknesses when they lack a financial expert, in particular an ac-
counting expert, on their audit committee. 34 In addition, firms with more inde-
pendent auditors or that recently have experienced a change in auditors are more
likely to have disclosed an internal control weakness. 35
Finally, Wilkinson and Clement examine the market reaction to early certifica-
tion of the accuracy of the firm's financial statements by CEOs. 36 On average, Wil-
kinson and Clement find no market reaction to early CEO certifications.237
However, they do find that for firms that already had strong corporate governance
225. See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 703, 711-40 (2007) (discussing the benefits and shortcomings of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 404).
226. Patterson & Smith, supra note 223, at 441.
227. Geiger et al., supra note 31, at 55.
228. Id. at 82.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 82-83.
231. See id. at 83.
232. See id.
233. Zhang et al., supra note 6.
234. Id. at 322.
235. See id.
236. See Willdnson & Clements, supra note 31. In the wake of the collapse of WorldCom, the SEC required
all CEOs to file sworn statements by August 14, 2002. See Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements
Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 No. 4-460 (June 27, 2002), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm.
237. See Wilkinson & Clements, supra note 31, at 131-32.
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mechanisms in place pre-SOX (such as firms that pay dividends, have appropriate
board size and have high institutional ownership-all proxies for good corporate
governance), these firms experienced significantly positive abnormal returns at the
time of the early CEO certification.23
VII. CONCLUSION
SOX is considered by many to be one of the most important pieces of corporate
legislation enacted since the securities laws of the 1930s.2 39 Like any major piece of
legislation it has generated a large amount of research.24 Many of the findings of
the research are not too surprising, e.g., smaller and younger firms are more likely
to suffer from internal control problems.2 4' However, three major themes come out
of reviewing the literature in accounting related to the Act. First, it is widely be-
lieved that SOX has restored investor confidence in the U.S. capital markets. 42 In
some regards, this position is more of belief than an empirical fact. It is incredibly
difficult to disentangle the impact of SOX from the impact of the other events
occurring concurrently. Second, when it comes to internal control problems the
details contained in the disclosure matter more than the simple disclosure of a
control problem.243 Finally, when we consider the effects of SOX, we need to focus
on the whole information environment. For example, the research has consistently
found no reaction to an internal control problem under section 404, but firms
must make section 302 disclosures, making the section 404 disclosures old news.244
The next couple of years will continue to be exciting times for followers of SOX.
Section 404 reporting has been credited with improving the internal control envi-
ronments of the accelerated filers, the largest companies in the United States. 241 So
much of the improvements from SOX go unobserved. The non-accelerated filers
start to report under section 404 for fiscal years ending on or after December 15,
2008.246 These companies are likely to benefit greatly from strong internal controls
systems. Improved internal controls should lead to better financial reporting qual-
ity. Continued improvements in financial reporting quality should continue to
strengthen investor confidence in the equity markets.
238. See id. at 138 (noting that "[ilt is likely that good corporate governance renders CEO early certification
more believable").
239. See, e.g., Testimony Concerning the Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing Before S.
Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (Sept. 9, 2003) (testimony of William H. Donald-
son, Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm.
240. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How
Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEo. L.J. 1843, 1858-1907 (2007) (discussing a vast number of empirical
studies related to Sarbanes-Oxley).
241. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
242. See JONAS ET AL., supra note 151, at 1.
243. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
245. See JONAS ET AL., supra note 151, at 4.
246. See Folladori, supra note 200, at 471.
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